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THE INQUISITORIAL POWERS OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN THIRD PARTY TAX
INVESTIGATIONS
One of the questions confronting every tax adviser whose client
is involved in an income tax audit is the extent of inquisitorial
power available to the Treasury Department during the course of
its examination. The problem becomes especially vexatious when
third parties such as banks, accountants, employers, or attorneys,
whose own tax liability is not being investigated, become the sub-
ject of inquiry in regard to the tax liability of another party Upon
the commencement of such an examination several questions im-
mediately arise What information in the possession of third parties
can the taxpayer prevent the examiner from obtaining? What
information can the third party withhold as a matter of privilege or
right, how far must the third party go in producing the requested
information?
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS IN GENERAL
The inquisitorial or visitorial powers of the Treasury Depart-
ment are vested exclusively in the Secretary of the Treasury and his
delegates.1 These powers are extensive, and reach not only the
taxpayer and his books and records, but also "any officer or em-
ployee of [the taxpayer], or any person having possession, custody,
or care of books of account containing entries relating to the busi-
ness of the person liable for tax or any other person the Secre-
tary or his delegate may deem proper."'2 In addition to this broad
class of persons subject to investigation there is a comprehensive
scope of inquiry which extends to any relevant or material books,
papers, records, data, and testimony of these persons.' As tinder
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, any request for informa-
tion which the revenue agent may properly make is enforceable
through the federal district court if the request is refused. 4 In addi-
tion, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 gives the examining
agents (the secretary's delegates) authority previously granted
only to the Collector-to issue summonses requiring parties to
appear with requested information, and, through a United States
District Court, have non-complying parties arrested and punished
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602. (The delegates are the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue and his agents.)
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602(2).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 7602(1), (3).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7604.
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for either civil5 or criminal0 contempt.7 Thus it is apparent that the
inquisitorial power of the Treasury is extremely broad, but this
power has long been recognized as a necessary aspect of our revenue
laws, and sometimes analogized to the fact-finding powers of federal
grand juries."
This investigative authority is not without confines, however.
Within the statute there are limitations as to the scope of inquiry,,
limitations upon the time and place of the examnnation, 10 and re-
strictions against unnecessary examinations and investigations."
-Scope of Izquiry. The examination must bear upon matters re-
quired to be included in the return under investigation. 12 If the agent
identifies the document with sufficient particularity and shows that it
is relevant to his examination, then his examination will not be con-
demned under the traditional cry that it is a "fishing expedition." It
is merely the arbitrary inquiry that is prohibited. 13 However, an
examining agent cannot conduct an examination of a taxpayer or
his records to obtain the names of unknown and unidentified parties
who may have failed to report income.14 Thus, a corporation could
not be compelled to produce its records which would reveal the
5. E.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Sauber v.
Whetstone, 199 F.2d 520 (1952), cert. desied, 344 U.S. 928 (1953) (where the
purpose of confinement was to compel compliance). This case arose under
§ 3615 of the 1939 Code which empowered only the Collector to issue a
summons.
6. Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 7210 provides for a fine of not more than
$1,000, or imprisonment for one year, or both, for failure to respond to a
summons issued pursuant to §§ 7602, and 7604(b).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 7602(2), 7604(b). For prior law see Int.
Rev. Code of 1939 §§ 3615(a), (e), 55 Stat 439.
8. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. deied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953) (dictum), Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844,
848 (8th Cir. 1929) (dictum).
9. Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602 provides that the investigation is con-
fined to relevant or matenal data and testimony.
10. Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605 (a).
11. nt Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(b). This section does not apply where
the books are those of a third person, and not the books of the one whose
tax liability is in question. Hubner v. Tucker, 56-2 U.S.T.C. f1 9937. rehearing
denied but earlier opion withdrawn, 57-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9362 (9th Cir., Jan. 30.
1957), Schulman v. Dunlap, 105 F Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (decided
under § 3631 of the 1939 Code which is identical to § 7605(b) of the 1954
Code).
12. First Nat Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1947) ; Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal 1940),
aff'd, 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942) (required further that the agent must satisfy
the court that what was sought "may be actually needed").
13. E.g., First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United States, supbra note 12 at
534, United States v. Third Northwestern Nat Bank, 102 F Supp. 879, 882(D. Minn.), dismissed on stipulation of parties, 196 F2d 501 (8th Cir.
1952), Miles v. United Founders Corp., 5 F Supp. 413. 414 (D. N.J. 1933).
14. McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1938) (an agent
sought to determine who received payment of a $10,000 check drawn by the
party under examination).
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identity of persons to whom payments had been made, where the
tax liability of the corporation was not under investigation ;", nor
could a trustee be compelled to disclose the names and addresses of
the beneficiaries of certain trusts who were identified only by the type
of information sought.1 6 However, a corporation which sought to
withhold its records to prevent disclosure of the names of stock-
holders involved in an exchange of stock between corporations
was required to produce its records.' 7 Although these latter two
cases appear to reach opposite results, they are reconcilable in that
the request in the former case only vaguely identified the taxpayers
under investigation by the nature of the information sought. This
information in itself could be obtained only by a laborious analysis
of many wills, in the latter case the class of persons was clearly
identified and the information sought imposed no undue burden
upon the corporation to inspect voluminous records. These cases
demonstrate that the agent does not have to specifically identify tax-
payers under investigation, but must identify them with a reason-
able degree of particularity The agent must indicate that he is
investigating a reasonably definite individual or group and is not
just performing the examination to see what he may uncover.
Thus the scope of inquiry limitation requires the examining
agent to specify with reasonable particularity the documents or
records sought, and show that these documents or records are
relevant or material to the tax returns of a reasonably specific tax-
payer or group of taxpayers.
Time and place of exanmnation. A corporate president has
been required to bring corporate records to the reventie agent's
office twenty-five miles away and leave them there for an anticipated
investigation of four months' duration. I" However, the examination
in that case had previously been attempted in the taxpayer's office,
and after a great deal of interference by the corporate employees, the
agent resorted to the subpoena power to get the desired information.
Probably the court would not have imposed such a hardship on the
taxpayer had the corporate officers and employees not been in-
cooperative during the initial visit of the agent. Although the
retention of a taxpayer's records for such an extended period of
time seems to be of doubtful propriety, the court indicated that the
rule as to a reasonable time and place will be elastic enough to permit
a thorough examination without undue hardship upon either the tax-
15. McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1938).
16. Mays v. Davis, 7 F Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934).
17 Miles v. United Founders Corp., 5 F Supp. 413 (D. N.J. 1933).
18. United States v. United Distillers Products Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d
Cir. 1946).
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payer or the agent. Presumably the same rule applicable to taxpayers
under investigation applies to third parties 0 since section 7605 (a)20
merely refers to examinations pursuant to section 7602, which does
not distinguish between taxpayers and third parties.2'
Unnecessary examinations or investigations. The right to be
protected against unnecessary examinations or investigations is
personnal to the taxpayer under investigaton,22 and a third party
cannot refuse to produce the requested documents on this basis.
Similarly, a taxpayer whose records have been examined with
respect to his own liability cannot refuse to give information from
his records which is later sought with respect to another taxpayer.
An opposite result here would virtually prevent inquiry into a tax-
payer's records once the records had been examined with respect
to the taxpayer's own tax liability
Exammnatzons barred by the statute of limitations. A restriction
not set forth in the statute but implicit in the Treasury's investiga-
tive power is the rule that no examination may be made concerning
tax liability for years which are barred by the statutes of limita-
tion.2- Consequently, in order for the revenue agent to obtain
information from either the taxpayer's or a third party's records
after the statute of limitations has run, it is necessary that the agent
allege fraud on the part of taxpayer whose tax liability is in ques-
tion.25 This does not greatly burden the agent, however, since he
19. In re Wolnch, 84 F Supp. 481 (D.C.N.Y. 1949) is a case where
an accountant was required to bring hIs records relative to another taxpayer to
an agent's office for examnation. However, the reasonableness of the time
and place of examination was not in issue.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605 (a).
21. See also Ii re Rivera, 79 F Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), where a
New York bank was required to produce records maintained by its branch
in Puerto Rico relative to a resident of Puerto Rico. The court pointed out
concerning the records that control and not actual possession %vas the im-
portant factor.
22. Schulman v. Dunlap, 105 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (The pro-
hibition of "unnecessary examination" was intended to prevent harassment
of the taxpayer by time-consuming repeated exammations).
23. Hubner v. Tucker, 56-2 U.S.T.C. I[ 9937, rehearing dented but earlier
opiuon withdrawn, 57-1 U.S.T.C. 1 9362 (9th Cir., Jan. 30, 1957).
24. The general rule is that the amount of any tax imposed may be
assessed within 3 years from the date of filing the return, except that a return
filed early is considered as being filed on the due date. The tax may be assessed
anytime in the case of fraud, a wilful attempt to evade, or where no return
has been filed. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501. E.g., Martin v. Chandis Securi-
ties Co., 33 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.Cal. 1940), aff'd, 128 F2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942) ;
In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D.C.Md. 1937), In re Brooklyn Pawn-
brokers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
25. E.g., United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 112 F
Supp. 720 (E.D.Ky. 1953), aff'd per curtan, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.), cert.
demed, 348 U.S. 838 (1954) ; Compare Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583(3d Cir. 1939), with Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) (on
the first appeal the internal revenue agent did not allege fraud).
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is not obliged to disclose in detail the facts relative to the investiga-
tion ;2 nor is the district court obligated to require facts showing
reasonable grounds to believe that the returns were false or
fraudulent where the agent testifies that his investigation up to that
point has raised a strong suspicion that the taxpayer filed a false or
fraudulent return for years barred by the statute of limitation.2 7 In
the case of a suspected omission of more than twenty-five per cent
of gross income,28 it appears that the test as to whether an exami-
nation can be made after the expiration of the normal three-year
statute of limitations, will be similar to the test in the case of
suspected fraud. In United States v. Umted Dtstillers Products
Corp 29 the court allowed the examination after the running of the
three-year statute, stating
Obviously, this provision [extending assessment time in the
case of an omission of more than 25 per cent of gross income]
would be of no practical effect if the Bureau were barred from
making the investigation necessary to ascertain such a misstate-
ment. Nor should it be required to prove the grounds of its
belief prior to examination of the only records which provide the
ultimate proof.30
Constitutional limitations. Both the fourth amendment, 3' pro-
hibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and the fifth amend-
ment 32 establishing the right against self-incrimination are applicable
to the inquisitorial powers of the government. However, the appli-
cation of these amendments in the case of third persons from whom
information is sought in tax investigations is different both in
scope and degree from their normal application.
The idea that the fourth amendment's prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures applies to judicially enforceable
subpoenas duces tecum was a somewhat unfortunate outgrowth of
26. United States v. United Distillers Products Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d
Cir. 1946) , United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 112 F Supp.
720 (E.D.Ky. 1953), aff'd per curan, 212 F.2d. 86 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 348
U.S. 838 (1954).
27 United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., note 26 supra,
accord In the Matter of Wood, 130 F Supp. 121 (W.D.Ky. 1955).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501 (e) (1). In the case of an omission
from gross income in excess of 25 per cent of the amount included in the re-
turn, the statute of limitations is extended to six years from the date of
filing the return.
29. 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946)
30. Id. at 874.
31. U.S. Const. amend. IV "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."
32. U.S.Const. amend. V "nor shall [any person] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."
[ Vol. 41:800
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a dictum in an 1886 decision.33 To escape this prohibition the gov-
ernment was required to show in subsequent cases that the de-
manded information was material to a specific matter under
investigation; privacy was often deemed paramount to the public
interest in obtaining requested information.3 4 The United States
Supreme Court in recent times has tended to revert to a more
literal interpretation of searches and seizures and subordinate
privacy to the public interest. However, the fourth amendment
will still be applied to administrative subpoenas duces tecum where
the 'demands are of undue breadth or include a demand for data
irrelevant to any authorized subject of inquiry 35 The new attitude
of the Supreme Court toward administrative investigations is readily
apparent in one of its recent decisions" "nothing more than official
curiosity" may justify the inquiry. But the court qualifies its posi-
tion saying, "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate
matters may be such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the
matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power.
... But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought
ii reasonably relevant."38 1 Judge Learned Hand has added an even
stronger tone in drawing a distinction between searches under the
subpoena power and those not so conducted"
No doubt a subpoena may be so onerous as to constitute an un-
reasonable search. . Even then, the sanction is unobjectionable,
unlike a descent upon one's dwelling or the seizure of one's
papers; the search is "unreasonable" only because it is out
of proportion to the end sought, as when the person served is
required to fetch all his books at once to an exploratory investi-
gation whose purposes and limits can be determined only as it
proceeds.3 7
Although the specific application of the fourth amendment will not
be dealt with at this point it should be noted that the taxpayer under
investigation may not prohibit the production of a third party's
records on the ground that it is an unreasonable search, since that
,,is a privilege personal to the owner of the records.3 8
33. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), see Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law § 33 at 106 (1951).
34. E.g., Hale v* Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
35. See Davis, Admmisirative Law § 33 at 106 (1951).
36. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
37 McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.), ccrt. dmcid, 301 U.S.
684 (1937) (Emphasis added).
38. Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939), In re Upham,
18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), (Note that control and ownership, not
possession, are the important factors) Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855, 860 "(8th Cir. 1956).
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The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination also
has a limited application to the inquisitorial powers of the Treasury
as applied to third parties. A third party may not refuse to produce
his records for examination in the determination of another's tax
liability unless in so doing he would incriminate himself."9 An
officer of a corporation is not protected from producing corporate
records even though such evidence may incriminate the officer or
the corporation. 0 However, the corporate officer may claim his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination after production
and identification of the corporate records, since the Treasury does
not have an unbounded right of interrogation after the records have
been produced and identified.41
In contrast to this impersonal treatment of corporate records for
purposes of the fifth amendment, is the treatment of partnership
books. Partnership books are considered to be of a personal char-
acter and a partner can properly refuse to produce them on the
grounds that they may tend to incriminate him.42 Whether this rule
will be given unlimited application regardless of the size of the
partnership is questionable when viewed in the light of the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. White.4" There the court held
that an officer of an unincorporated labor union had no right under
the fourth and fifth amendments to refuse to produce union
records in his possession on the ground that they might tend to
incriminate either the union or himself. In so holding the court
stated
The test is whether one can fairly say under all the circum-
stances that a particular type of organization has a character so
impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it
cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or
personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only 44
It appears that the fifth amendment could be further limited in
its applicability to administrative investigations by the so-called
"quasi-public records" exception. In Shapiro v. United States,45
the Supreme Court held that records required to be kept by the,
39. In re Friedman, 104 F Supp. 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
40. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43 (1906) , (Nor does the privilege extend to one'who has records of a
dissolved corporation in his possession) Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S.
478 (1913)
41. See United States v. Lawn, 115 F Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y 1953)
42. Ibid.
43. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
44. Id. at 701.
45. 335 U.S. 1 (1948)
[Vol. 41:800
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Emergency Price Control Act became "public" and therefore could
not be withheld from examination on the ground of self-incrimina-
tion. It has not been decided whether records required to be kept
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code 0 and the applicable
regulations,4 7 are within this exception, but as one of the dissenters
in the Shapiro case pointed out, there is no reason for not applying
it to any law requiring records to be kept, including section 54(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1 9 39.4s The "public records"
doctrine, if followed in the tax field, would increase immensely the
scope of the Treasury's investigative powers, especially in fraud
investigations where the fifth amendment most often comes into
play.
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS As APPLIED TO SPECIFIC
TiarP, PARTIES
Having determined the extent of the inquisitorial powers avail-
able to the Treasury, the limitations on these powers, and the
defenses available to parties upon whom the powers are exercised,
the operation of these factors in regard to specific third persons may
be examined.
Accountants. The accountant appears to be the most vulnerable
of the third parties. Whether or not he is certified, the accountant
like any other third person cannot refuse to turn over the taxpayer's
books and records if he has them in his possession when he is
served with a valid subpoena,49 and a refusal to comply with such a
subpoena may result in liability for criminal contempt.5 0 It is also
well established that the accountant like any other third party can-
not claim the privilege against self-incrimination for the taxpayer.5 1
Only if he claims it for himself can the accountant assert the fifth
amendment privilege, which even then will extend only to such
papers and documents as belong to the accountant or are in his
possession "in a purely personal capacity."52
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6011.
47. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.54-1 (1953).
48. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 54 (1948) (dissent). Perhaps
it is significant that Mr. Justice Jackson, who also dissented in the Shapiro
case, later seemed to modify his opinion in favor of the quasi-public records
doctrine. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22,
34 (1953), he stated that the privilege against self-incrimination should not
be allowed to destroy the taxing power of the government.
49. E.g., Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. dented,
346 U.S. 864 (1953) ; In re Wolrich, 84 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
50. Donnelly v. United States, 201 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1953).
51. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
52. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944). As yet no
case has defined the phrase "purely personal capacity."
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Furthermore, the accountant does not have a privileged rela-
tionship with his client similar to the attorney-client privilege. In
Falsone v. United States,53 the court quoted Wigmore in giving its
reason for the denial of the privilege, saying
The investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial
duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of these privi-
leges. They should be recognized only with the narrowest limits
required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to
provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administra-
tion of justice.54
Even though the rules and regulations of the Treasury Department
grant to an enrolled agent the same "rights, powers, and privi-
leges as an enrolled attorney," 5 this does not include the right
to assert a privileged accountant-client relationship. 0 Federal courts
also disregard state law providing that communications between
the accountant and his client shall be privileged, saying that such
statutes are inapplicable to administrative proceedings between
the taxpayer and the federal government." Nor will the fact that
the accountant is hired by an attorney make the accountant's com-
munications with the client or his records privileged. The two
cases establishing this proposition are Hinmmelfarb v. United
States,5" and Gariepy v. United States." ' In Himmelfarb a lavyer
had engaged an accountant in connection with a tax fraud case
against one of the lawyer's clients. The accountant had participated
in several conferences with the attorney when the client was pre-
sent. Later at the trial when the accountant was called as a Govern-
ment witness, objection was made to the admission of his testimony
because of the attorney-client relationship. However, the court
held there was no privilege and analyzed the lav as follows ( 1 ) If
the taxpayer disclosed the information to the accountant there was
no privilege. (2) If the disclosures were made by the taxpayer to
the attorney in the presence of the accountant, the taxpayer in-
pliedly authorized the attorney to make disclosures and thereby
waived the privilege. (3) If the attorney made disclosures to the
accountant without the taxpayer's consent the privilege would
attach.
53. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
54. Id. at 740, quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (3d ed. 1940).
55. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(f) (1949) (practice of attorneys and agents before
the Treasury Department)
56. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 741 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 864 (1953).
57 Id. at 742.
58. 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. dented, 338 U.S. 860 (1949)
59. 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 41:800
NOTES
The court in Applying the second rationale reasoned that since
the accountant's presence was not indispensable in order for the
communication to be made to the attorney, no privilege attached.
In the Gariepy case an accountant was forced to testify in a tax
fraud case as to the source of certain income to the taxpayer.
Although the accountant was not hired by the attorney, the court
reiterated the proposition that the privilege would not apply even
if he had been so employed.
A rationale that has been successfully used to prevent pre-trial
discovery of information relating to litigation between two private
parties, is the "work product" doctrine. Under this doctrine the
attorney-client privilege has been held to apply to the employment of
various experts by the attorney 0 Since the accountant is an expert
in the preparation and analysis of financial records it seens logical
that the attorney-client privilege should apply when he is employed
by the attorney and the work performed is turned over to the
attorney. It was so held in Colonial Airlines, Ivc. v. lanas,61 where
suit was brought by the corporation against corporate officers for
the improper expenditure of funds. A firm of public accountants
had compiled an audit of the corporation's books. In holding that the
report need not be produced for copying, the court found that it was
prepared at the request of the corporation's counsel in preparation
for defense of another suit and in prosecuting the suit in question,
and that the regular books were available. The court reasoned that
since the work was done in preparation for trial, the "work
product" doctrine applied, and the report need not be produced.
Whether this doctrine will be readily accepted by the courts when
the problem involved is the collection of taxes rather than litigation
between private parties is questionable. However, it appears to
rest on firmer ground than the rationale of the Hinnelfarb case.
As to the person who is both an accountant and a law~yer, the
type of service performed for the client will determine the availability
of the privilege. In Olender v. United States2 the taxpayer em-
ployed a member of an accounting firm who was both a certified
public accountant and an attorney to prepare a net worth statement
60. The attorney-client privilege has been held to apply to the employ-
ment of: an engineering expert, Lewis v. United Airlines Transport Corp.,
32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D.Pa. 1940), a patent expert, Lalance and Grosjean Mfg.
Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 Fed. 563 (2d Cir. 1898) ; Cold Metal Process
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948). But cf. Sachs
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948). A testing and
analysis expert, Empire Box Corp. v. Illinois Cereal Mills, 90 A_2d 672
(Sup. Ct. Del. 1952).
61. 13 F.R.D. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
62. 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1954).
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and income tax returns for him. When the accountant-lawyer
later claimed his communications with the client were privileged,
the court held him to be engaged strictly in accounting work
and denied him the privilege. In an earlier case it was held that an
accountant who later became the firm's lawyer could not claim his
communications at the time he was an accountant to be privileged
although he later rendered legal advice based upon that data."'
Although the accountant's books and papers are actually trans-
ferred to an attorney such records are not privileged. 4 As stated
in American Jurisprudence,
The reason is obvious, the administration of justice could easily
be defeated if a party and his counsel could, by transferring from
the one to the other important papers required as evidence in a
cause, thereby prevent the court from compelling the production
of important papers on a trial.6'
Nor is the accountant in a position to raise the objection that the
examination or investigation is unnecessary, since this objection
is available to the taxpayer alone."' Thus it appears that the account-
ant is practically defenseless when served with a valid subpoena.
However, in two situations privilege will apply First, where infor-
mation is communicated to the accountant by the attorney in the
absence of the client and without the client's consent. Second,
where the accountant is both an attorney and an accountant, and
has obtained the information while performing legal services for
his client.
Attorneys. The attorney is in a much better position to withhold
information than any other third party, his best defense being the
attorney-client privilege. However, the attorney cannot refuse to
be sworn, but must assert the confidential privilege as the occasion
arises.6 7 The privilege is not absolute, but extends only to docu-
ments and information received by the attorney while engaged in his
63. In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), But see Allen Sanford
Gottlieb, P-H 1953 T.C. Mene. Dec. % 53282 (where communications to
attorney-accountant who prepared the tax returns were held privileged).
64. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), ccrt. dented,
346 U.S. 864 (1953). However, the fifth amendment may still be applicable.
See Application of House, 144 F Supp. 95 (N.D.Cal. 1956) (an attorney was
allowed to invoke the fifth amendment for his client and withhold information
in "work papers" owned by the client but prepared by the accountant and
transferred to the attorney).
65. 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, § 501 at 281 (1939)
66. Hubner v. Tucker, 56-2 U.S.T.C. 5 9937, rehearing denied bnt earlier
opinion withdrawn, 57-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9362 ( 9th Cir., Jan. 30, 1957) , Schulman
v. Dunlap, 105 F Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
67 Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum) , see
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2322 (3d ed. 1940).
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professional capacity. For instance where the lawyer had performed
clerical and bookkeeping services in the handling of a commercial
bank account for his client, no confidential privilege attached.0 8 Nor
does the privilege attach where the lawyer simply deposits funds
in a bank for his client,69 or acts as a mere scrivener on transactions
involving the transfer of title to real estate.70 Similarly, privileged
communications cannot be made to the attorney in furtherance of
a crime-such as tax evasion-since such advice would not be
rendering a professional service but rather would be participation
in a conspiracy.71
Anything the taxpayer himself can assert as being privileged
can be withheld by the attorney if the information or books and
records are in the attorney's possession."- However, the attorney-
client privilege does not attach to documents solely because they are
transferred to an attorney's possession, whether the transfer is made
by the taxpayer or some third party.7 3 If the question of privilege
is in dispute undoubtedly the attorney will want to, or have to, turn
over the documents to the district judge for a determination of
whether the privilege is applicable. The decision of the court in
this respect is usually held to be appealable.7 4
Both the privilege and the right to waive the privilege are
personal to the client. 5 However, the attorney should keep in mind
that the client will be deemed to have impliedly waived the privilege
if a third person, not the attorney's clerk or secretary, is present
when the communications between the client and attorney take
place.7 6
Closely allied to the attorney-client privilege is the need for
privacy and freedom from interference in preparation of the client's
case for trial: This concept, embodied in the "work product" doc-
trine, is designed to protect the effectiveness of the lawyer's prepa-
68. United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433 (N.D.Cal. 1952).
69. Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 993 (1953).
70. United States v. DeVasto, 52 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. dended, 284
U.S. 678 (1931).
71. United States v. DeVasto, note 70 supra; McCormick, Evidence § 99(1954).
72. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2307 (3d ed. 1940).
73. See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.'), cert. dented.
350 U.S. 1006 (1956) ; Falsone v. United States, 205 F2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.).
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) , Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States
Electnc Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
74. Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
75. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (3d ed. 1940), see Himmelfarb v.
United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denred, 338 U.S. 860(1949).
76. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (3d ed. 1940).
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ration for trial and is incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure encompassing pre-trial discovery "1 Some of the ramifi-
cations of this doctrine were discussed earlier in the discussion
relative to accountants and their employment by attorneys. Since
we are dealing with disclosures in an administrative proceeding in
which the applicability of the Rules is somewhat questionable,"8
and since at this stage of the examination little, if any, work will
have been performed in preparation for trial, the "work product"
doctrine will not be dealt with further.
Although a refusal, based on the fifth amendment, to produce
requested records applies to the attorney only when he actually
owns or possesses records which might incriminate him, t the
fourth amendment has its usual breadth and relevancy limitations.
Schwntunier v. Unted States8 is illustrative. The attorney's files
were sought in connection with a grand jury investigation of one
of his clients for tax evasion. The attorney had stored his files
and was out of the jurisdiction at the time two subpoenas duces
tecum were served upon the storing warehouse. The first subpoena
requested production of all the books, records, and correspondence
held by the warehouse for the attorney The second was more
limited, requesting all of the books, records, and correspondence
pertaining to three.named taxpayers. The court quashed the first
subpoena as being so broad as to constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure, but modified the second to require the disclosure of
all requested information to which the attorney-client privilege did
not attach. Thus it is apparent that the breadth and relevancy lini-
tations upon a subpoena duces tecurn apply to the lawyer's files as
they do to other third parties.
Banks. Banks constitute one of the major groups upon which
the Treasury makes continuous demands for information and
records. They too cannot assert the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion on behalf of the taxpayer, since this is a personal defense of the
taxpayer. The unreasonable search and seizure prohibition of the
-fourth amendment has been held to be inapplicable.8' However,
77 Fed. R. Civ. P 26-37
78. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. demcd, 346
U.S. 864 (1953) , see also In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209
F2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
79. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1956) The
attorney may refuse to produce records tending to incriminate the client on the
basis of the attorney-client privilege in appropriate cases. See note 72 szpra
and related text.
80. 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956)
81. United States v. First Nat. Bank of Mobile, 295 Fed. 142 (S.D.Ala.),
aff'd per curiam, 267 U. S. 576 (1924) , Cooley v. Bergin, 27 F.2d 930 (D.
Mass. 1928).
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courts in fact do impose limitations on breath relevancy of sub-
poenaed information on the ground that the inquiry is "oppressive or
unreasonable."
8 2
In United States ex rel. Sathre v. Third Northwestern Nat.
Bank, 3 a special agent of the Intelligence Unit wanted"
All records of cashier's checks, bank money orders and certifi-
cates of deposit purchased by, endorsed by, or paid to or for
[twelve or thirteen individuals] together with any, and all such
paid, cashed, or honored cashier's checks, bank money orders
and certificates of deposit and supporting documents and
records.8 4
Although the agent attached a note offering to check the records
himself if the bank desired, the bank refused the offer and failed to
obey the summons. The court held that the bank need not examine
voluminous records for the purpose of finding cashier's checks, etc.,
of a suspected evader, where there was no showing of reasonable
grounds for belief that such items even existed. Likewise, a bank
cannot be compelled to unfold voluminous records containing in-
formation concerning people whose tax liability is not under
examination. In First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United Slates,8s the
court said:
[The agent] may first obtain information as to what papers or
documents are within the Bank's possession relevant to the
inquiry by interrogating, under oath, an appropriate officer of
the Bank. Upon a satisfactory showing by the agent that certain
pertinent records or documents have a bearing upon matters
required to be included in the return under investigation, the
Bank would be required to produce them for the inspection of
the agent, whereupon the agent would determine for himself
whether or not they were relevant to his needs and take copies
thereof if he so desired."6
In so stating, the court modified the original order to produce, by
confining it to records relevant to the taxpayer under investigation
rather than allowing the original order which requested records
"irrespective of whether such records also pertained to similar
transactions [between the bank and] other persons or firms." '
82. United States ex rel. Sathre v. Third Northwestern Nat. Bank, 102
F. Supp. 879 (D. Minm. 1952), dismissed on stipulation of parties, 196 F.2d 501
(8th Cir. 1952) ; McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301
U.S. 684 (1937) (broker).
83. 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952), distzissed on stipulatiol of parties,
196 F2d 501 (8th Cir. 1952).
84. Id. at 881.
85. 160 F2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
86. Id. at 534.
87. Id. at 533.
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As early as 1928 it was held in Cooley v. Bergin8 that the de-
positor had no proprietary interest in a bank's books or records and,
at most, could claim that such records should not be disclosed for
the purpose of inflicting deliberate injury upon him. In that case
the agent asked for records of deposits and withdrawals of a cer-
tain taxpayer for a period of two years. The court in upholding the
agent reasoned that a proceeding to obtain the information invaded
no rights of the depositor under the fourth amendment as to
unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor could the bank refuse
production of the records on the basis that some of the entries would
relate to transactions of persons whose tax was not under investi-
gation.
The books and papers of a foreign branch bank need not be
produced, but if the branch is located in a dependency or possession
of the United States the records will have to be brought forth. The
case of In re Harris9 involved a trustee in bankruptcy who served
a subpoena duces tecum upon the London office of a New York bank,
requesting a transcript of the account of the bankrupt with the bank.
The court refused to compel the bank to prepare the transcript on
the basis that the foreign branch was not within the "control" of
the main office in the United States so as to be subject to the sub-
poena. However, the Harris case is distinguished by the court which
decided In re Rivera.90 There an internal revenue agent served a
subpoena upon a New York bank for the production of records
located in a Puerto Rico branch. In holding the subpoena valid the
court said the term "foreign branches" does not include branches in
the dependencies or possessions of the United States. Neither did
the fact that the United States internal revenue laws were not
applicable in Puerto Rico prevent the issuance and service of the
summons in New York. Since the internal revenue laws were
applicable to both the corporation upon whom the summons was
served and the taxpayer being investigated, Puerto Rico law did
not prohibit this request for information.
In summary, banks must generally obey the subpoena, but can
refuse if they show-"
a. that the request is unreasonably broad in scope,
b. that the records sought are not readily identifiable and con-
vemently obtainable,
88. 27 F.2d 930 (D. Mass. 1928)
89. 27 F Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
90. 79 F Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
91. See United States v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 112 F Supp.
720, 723 (E.D.Ky. 1953), aff'd per curzam, 212 F.2d 86 (6th Cir.), cert. dened,
348 U.S. 838 1954).
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c. that they are not relevant to the inquiry;
d. that previous investigations of the same records have ren-
dered further investigations unnecessary or oppressive,
e. or that the revenue agent has acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or with any motive other than to make a lawful examination.
One area of uncertainty relative to banks as third parties is the
application of the inquisitorial powers to information contained in
safe deposit boxes. However, since the normal contract between the
bank and a safe deposit box renter places the renter m control, it
would seem that a demand to produce the contents of a safe deposit
box would have to be made upon the renter rather than the bank.
Employers. Most employers have a wealth of information con-
cerning their officers and employees and therefore are frequently
the subject of an internal revenue agent's inquiry. In Local 174,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO,92 the Internal
Revenue Service suspected fraud in the tax return of one of the
union's employee-officers and was inspecting union records to
verify its beliefs. However, the court of appeals held the district
court's order to produce any and all cash books, day books, bank
deposit slips, cancelled checks, check stubs, loan ledger cards, indi-
vidual payroll records, financial statements, and tax returns for a
ten year period to be arbitrary and unreasonable. In denying the
order the court said there was no showing that any specific item or
document was relevant to the investigation, material to the inquiry,
or that the documents were in the possession of the union. A
vigorous dissent rejected the majority's position except as to the
unlimited time factor. Categorizing the majority as students of the
old school of thought on the scope of administrative investigations,
the dissent emphatically pointed to the more recent liberal treatment
of such investigations. He suggested that the holding severely cur-
tailed the administrative power of investigation and completely
ignored the public interest."' Since the order for the production
of the records did not confine itself to records pertinent only to the
official under investigation, the holding appears consistent with the
recent cases. However, since the Internal Revenue Service sought
to prove that the official had never repaid "loans" made to him, it is
doubtful whether the order could have been drafted in any other
form and still have obtained the necessary information. In this
92. 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956). See also Beatty v. United States, 227
F2d 350 (8th Cir. 1955) (an employer was required to produce his books and
records for the determination of employee-independent contractor status for
social security purposes).
93. Id. at 393.
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respect the dissent seems to see the realities of the situation and
would appear to reach the more practical result.
In Boren v. Tucker,9 4 the request to the employer-corporation
was "to produce for examination, copying, photostating or photo-
graphing," 95 the general journal, cash journal, general ledger, and
payroll records and checks bearing certain signatures, all for a six
month period. The examination was being conducted in connec-
tion with the income tax liability of the corporation's president and
vice-president, who were husband and wife. In upholding the civil
contempt of the two officers and the corporation itself, the court
held that the examination was not a re-examination but a continua-
tion of a previous examination, that an examination included the
right to photostat the records, that the examination was not pre-
cluded by the possibility that a criminal prosecution might arise
from it, and that the facts showed that the records were reasonably
relevant and material. One of the major reasons the order was found
proper was the relatively short period covered by the requested
records.
It appears that the employer, as well as other third parties, will
be better advised to base his refusal to produce the demanded in-
formation upon the ground that the scope of the examination was
unduly broad, rather than upon the possible tax or criminal con-
sequences that might arise from their production.
Business Associates. Those who engage in business transactions
with the taxpayer may also be compelled to produce their records
when information regarding the taxpayer is sought. This is so
even though the books and records of the associate may have been
examined with respect to hi own tax liability on a previous occa-
sion.96 However, in Hubner v. Tucker, 7 the contestant who had
various dealings with the taxpayer through a dissolved corporation
and partnership was not required to produce the requested records
because the agent failed to show that any particular documents were
either relevant or material. This extremely broad request demanded
Books of account of the partnership and the corporation
relating to transactions had by that partnership and corporation
with [the taxpayers] for the years stated, together with
paid checks, invoices, correspondence, and any and all miscel-
laneous transactions [with the taxpayers] 98
94. 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956)
95. Id. at 768.
96. Hubner v. Tucker, 56-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9937, rehearing dencd but carlier
optnion withdrawi, 57-1 U.S.T.C. 9362 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1957) , In re Kee-
gan, 18 F Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
97 Note 96 supra.
98. Hubner v. Tucker, note 96 supra at 56575.
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In spite of its holding that this order requiring production was not
enforceable, the court said that upon a showing of relevancy,
materiality, and an absence of oppression to the contestant, and
subject, of course, to her personal right to invoke the fifth amend-
ment on specific documents, the evidence would have to be produced.
If a question arises as to the taxability of stock transfers or ex-
changes, the agent can compel production of the corporate books
in order to determine the names of individuals stockholders so that
their treatment of such a transaction might be ascertained."
Similarly, brokers are subject to having their records examined,
unless the demand is oppressive or unreasonable, even though a
customer may attempt to prohibit a disclosure. 00
Not only are business associates' records subject to production
but relevant information that their employees have may be com-
pelled to be produced as well. In Stone v. Frandle,01 the stenogra-
pher of one party was compelled to produce her stenographic notes
relative to an arbitration proceeding which bore on another party's
tax liability
Hospital records are another source of information which the
Internal Revenue Service may obtain upon a proper request. In the
case of It re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital,10 2 the agent
was seeking information relative to a doctor's income tax liability.
The court allowed examination of the hospital records to obtain the
names and addresses of patients, although the court said the nature
of the patients' illness should not be disclosed to the agent. The
court went on to say that as to any subsequent interrogation of the
patients, "The public interest in the collection of taxes owing by a
taxpayer outweighs the private interest of the patient to avoid em-
barrassment resulting from being required to give the revenue
agent information as to fees paid the attending physician." ' In
Gretsky v. Basso,10 4 a hospital treasurer was also required to pro-
duce the records desired by an agent, although the agent was spe-
cifically instructed not to copy the nature of any illnesses from the
record. The rationale of the courts in the hospital cases is that
99. Miles v. United Founders Corp., 5 F Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1933).
100. Cf. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 301 U.S.
684 (1937) (customer attempted to prevent the brokers from complying with
subpoena issued by SEC to produce copy of customer's account). h, re An-
drews, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D.Md. 1937).
101. 89 F. Supp. 222 (D. Minn. 1950).
102. 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953).
103. Id. at 124.
104. 136 F Supp. 640 (D.Mass. 1955).
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since the doctor-patient privilege does not prohibit the disclosure
of the names of the doctor's patients, the hospital should also be
required to disclose the names of its patients.
CONCLUSION
The courts have been vigilant in balancing the interests of private
parties against those ot the Treasury Department in its quest for
tax dollars. However, as society grows in complexity, the processes
of record keeping also become more complex. Information pertain-
ing to a thorough tax examination of a single year may be scattered
throughout numerous records for several years. This puts a greater
burden on a party whenever he is asked to assemble his infornia-
tion in order that an examination may be conducted. But a greater
burden is also put upon the Treasury to make a thorough examina-
tion because of the increased number of records which it must go
through in making its audit. With this in mind it appears that the
Treasury will have to be given even greater latitude in tax investiga-
tions than the courts have been willing to give it thus far As said
in United States v. Morton Salt Co.'0 5 referring to the power of
the FTC to compel information
The only power that is involved here is the power to get infor-
mation from those who best can give it and who are most
interested in not doing so. Because judicial power is reluctant if
not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant
to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative
agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not
have and exercise powers of original inquiry It has a power
of inquisition which is not derived from the judicial func-
tion. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not
depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated,
or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When in-
vestigative and accusatory duties are delegated by a statute to an
administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to
whether there is probable violation of the law 100
Thus in the absence of some breach of the fundamental liberties, and
in the interest of fairness to all taxpayers, it would seem that such
a law-enforcing agency as the Internal Revenue Service, should
have the right to satisfy itself that behavior is consistent both with
the law and the public interest. Remembering that the administra-
tive process is a relative newcomer to the legal system and that it
has taken and will continue to take experience and trial and error
105. 338 U.S. 632 (1950)
106. Id. at 642-43.
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to fit this process into the system, to unduly restrict administrative
investigatory powers appears contrary to the public interest. "The
suppression of truth is a grievious necessity at best justified, if
at all, only when the opposed private interest is supreme."10
107 McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), cert. dosted, 301 U.S.
684 (1937).
